Not sure what you mean, but it seems you are implying that the SRK hash cannot be read from user space as you are referring to the fuses scan protection and not the availability of a user space app/lib/script that can check the CSF signature. I am evaluating the SabreSD i.MX6SX platform and I can run the following commands to read from the eFuse shadow cache:
root@imx6sxgen4:/sys/fsl_otp# cat HW_OCOTP_SRK0
0x0
root@imx6sxgen4:/sys/fsl_otp# cat HW_OCOTP_LOCK
0x20820002
From the Security doc it does mention "Scan protection", but this seems to be from the perspective of JTAG scanning. Some fuses are (and should be) read protected such as HW_OCOTP_OTPMK0 (master key):
root@imx6sxgen4:/sys/fsl_otp# cat HW_OCOTP_OTPMK0
0xbadabada
But the SRK hash is not something that needs to be confidential so I would expect it to be readable. The reference manual (6/2016) seems to support this from section 44.5.25 Shadow Register form OTP Bank3 Word0 (SRK Hash) (OCOTP_SRK0):
Shadow register for the hash of the Super Root Key word0 (Copy of OTP Bank 3, word 0 (ADDR =0x1C)). These bits become read-only after the HW_OCOTP_LOCK_SRK bit is set.
So it seems it is still readable even when the SRK is locked (as expected). Granted, the device does not have the SEC_CONFIG bit set so I’m not sure if the behavior of reading the SRK shadow registers using sysfs changes under these conditions. Are you saying that HW_OCOTP_SRK0..7 cannot be read, or more specifically cannot be read after SEC_CONFIG bit is set? If yes, why?