************************************************************************************************************** The FRDM-A9957HN is an EVB designed for evaluation of PCA9957 daisy-chain SPI-compatible 4-wire serial bus controlled 24-channel constant current LED driver optimized for dimming and blinking 32 mA Red/Green/Blue/Amber (RGBA) LEDs. * The FRDM-A9957HN is designed to be used with FRDM-KL25Z Freedom Development Platform and an SDK example code.  * * Connection:      FRDM-KL25Z           OM13513 * VDD                 J9-4                           J9-2                                                                                                           * VDDIO             J9-8                            J9-4 * GND                 J2-14                         J2-7 * MOSI               J2-8                            J2-4 * MISO               J2-10                          J2-5 * SCLK               J2-12                          J2-6 * CS                   J2-6                            J2-3 * RESET            J9-6                            J9-3 ***************************************************************************************************************  

Because of sometimes customer test fail on CAN short GND function, below shows the test step and result for verify. So need emphasize that EVB only works on debug mode.  Do not confuse about Debug/Normal mode and INIT/Normal mode in the state machine. You can short CAN on EVB every CAN points to GND, but actual in application customer boards sometimes the distance between CAN points and GND is so long and with more noise on bus line. so please take care of this short function should be meet the spec in datasheet.  ----Test 1: Test under INIT mode, CAN short GND function works well. Short CAN_L to GND, has a flag on CANL_.     We can’t write the CAN_LIN_MODE register, only can read.  After read CAN_LIN_MODE register, we find that CAN works on the normal mode.         ----Test 2: Test under normal mode operation after configure INIT_INT register. Short CANL to GND, the CANL_ flag set ‘1’ ,this CAN short to GND works well, without re-set the CAN_LIN_MODE register, then we read the information that CAN works on normal mode.     Setting the CAN in sleep mode then short CANL to GND,can’t detect the fault bit.  

Four live demonstrations are presented: Timing Attack; Simple Power Analysis; Fault Attack, and finally an RFID Relay Attack demo. Timing Attack demo The Timing Attack demo shows the importance of securely implementing a PIN verification. If a PIN verification is implemented with operations which are not time-invariant - for example an if-else construction - it is possible to identify when an incorrect PIN digit is being compared by observing the timing information of the corresponding EM side-channel measurement. By iterating through all possible values of a PIN digit the correct character will be identified in a maximum of 10 attempts. To make the PIN query secure, a time-invariant comparison has to be implemented. For example, a bitwise XOR comparison and subsequent OR operation for all PIN digits, ensures the same time is taken for all possible comparisons. This scheme is illustrated in the block diagram.             Simple Power Analysis demo The RSA-Algorithm implemented in the Simple Power Analysis demo application is reduced to a simple 8-Bit implementation for illustrative purposes. The physical smart card interface used is contact-based. By monitoring the voltage drop across a shunt resistor it is possible to measure the power consumption of an RSA operation on a digital oscilloscope. Observation of the resulting measurements reveal that it is possible to visually distinguish  single square operations from square and multiply operations. By iteratively logging this sequence of operations, the bits of the exponent, that is the secret key, can be directly identified. By using countermeasures like the square and always multiply algorithm, the decoding of the exponent bits can be prevented and the key protected. The square and always multiply algorithm is illustrated in the block diagram.    Fault Attack demo The Fault Attack demo shows what can happen at software execution, if a flashlight is fired on a decapsulated chip which has no security measures. With simple tools – a mechanical grinding tool and some chemical etchant - it is possible to expose the surface of the chip and crudely inject photons into the sensitive silicon substrate. In this case the flashlight causes a skip in the execution of the PIN verification code if the flash is discharged close to the surface at the correct moment. In normal function expiration the UserPin is either correct or incorrect and access to the data is granted or denied accordingly. With a successful flashlight attack it doesn’t matter which value for UserPin is entered - after several tries the attacker skips the query and has access to the secret data.    RFID Relay Attack demo The RFID Relay Attack demo demonstrates a new paradigm in relay attacks in the context of software emulated smartcards on mobile devices. Previous conditions about proximity of the attacker to the victim and the time when the victim is approached, are negated. With a software emulated smartcard on a mobile device an attacker can intercept and relay the transaction of a potential victim remotely. This new attack paradigm greatly enhances the value of this attack for criminals, and consequently will result in greater malware development efforts. Additional Information on the individual attacks

*************************************************************************************************** The PCA9957 is a daisy-chain SPI-compatible 4-wire serial bus controlled 24-channel constant current LED driver optimized for dimming and blinking 32 mA Red/Green/Blue/Amber (RGBA) LEDs. * This simple example code was created for FRDM-KL25Z freedom board plus FRDM-A9957HN evaluation board. The code is sets the PCA9957 for the gradation control of all LED channels. * * Connection:      FRDM-KL25Z           OM13513 * VDD                 J9-4                           J9-2                                                                                                           * VDDIO             J9-8                            J9-4 * GND                 J2-14                         J2-7 * MOSI               J2-8                            J2-4 * MISO               J2-10                          J2-5 * SCLK               J2-12                          J2-6 * CS                   J2-6                            J2-3 * RESET            J9-6                            J9-3 ***************************************************************************************************