Trusted Platforms for Cyber Physical Systems

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
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Agenda

- What are Cyber Physical Systems?
- Securing the Complete Lifecycle
- NXP Embedded Security Technology
- Key HW Roots of Trust Explained
- Leveraging NXP HW Root of Trust
- EdgeScale Simplify Life-cycle Mgmt

1990s – 2016: An Era of Security/Trust Breaches

As computer systems have grown more capable, complex...so have the **attacks**!






IoT Introduces Cyber Physical Systems






Device Lifecycle Management



NP






NXP Has a Core Competence in End-to-End System Security

Mobile and stationary machines want full access to cloud-based knowledge

This requires faster, more reliable and secure connectivity

NXP is at the forefront of secure communications and tamper resistance

Leadership experience in security markets: over 10 Billion smart cards sold






Rich Set of Platform Trust Capabilities

- Generate device/ OEM-specific public/private key-pair
- Use to sign, validate record of fuse configuration and establish identity
- Isolate and assign memory and IO blocks to different applications/VMs
- Prevent tampering of system by malicious applications

 Detect Physical tampering of the device or memory contents

- Lock-down system or zero-ize secrets
 - Allow debug-ports to be locked down in field
 - Secure access to debug via challenge/response




- Internal BootROM + Fuses validate Trusted Firmware
- Build Chain of Trust from TF-A to OS to Applications
 - Internally generate device-specific AES keys
 - Use SEC engine to encrypt/decrypt sensitive data, keys, certificates

- Internally generate, encrypt and use keys within SEC engine
- Prevent memory-based attacks from stealing TLS/IPsec keys
- Lock-out up to 7 keys used to validate Trusted Firmware and OS.
- Prevent older, vulnerable versions of firmware from running.




Trusted Platform Architectures



SoC with Separated Execution

Environment (SEE)

<u>SoC with TrustZone + Trust-Arch + Secure Element:</u> i.e. Layerscape, i.MX + Secure Element



SoC with SEE, HW RoT, HW Root Keys, and Physically Isolated Execution Environment, Storage




Layerscape, i.MX + SE = Level 3 Hardening

Layerscape, i.MX have Trust Architecture

- HW Crypto engine
- HW encryption of off-chip storage
- HW Key generation, masterkey
- HW Tamper detection
- ARM TrustZone for secure host services
- Secure boot cannot bypass Trust Arch.


Combination of

- Trust-Architecture (HW RoT)
- Trust-Zone (SEE → TEE)
- Secure Element (Secure storage)
- = Level 3 hardened system





Layerscape Trust Architecture 3.0



Layerscape Trust Arch Dedicated IP

Layerscape Datapath IP with Trust Arch extensions

TrustZone IP

QorlQ Trust Arch (Trust 3.0): Persistent Storage Security Fuse Processor & Battery Backed Storage

Secret – not readable once written

NXP Section

- 1b Factory Section Write Protect
- 1b Clear_SFF (disable Scan)
- 1b Deploy
- 1b Retest
- 64b Factory Unique ID
- 96b Factory Scratchpad
- 256b Factory Secure Mfg Key Split

Battery Backed SecMon Registers

- 256b Zeroizable Master Key
- 128b Scratchpad 0-3 (configurably zeroized)
- 48b Monotonic Counter

OEM Section

- 1b OEM Section Write Protect
- 1b Intent to Secure
- 1b SEC disable
- 7b Key Revocation
- 16b 16 'era' bits for BB monotonic counter
- 2b Field Return
- 3b Debug mode
- 256b Super Root Key (List) Hash
- 64b Debug Challenge Value
- 64b Debug Response Value
- 256b One Time Programmable Master Key
- 32b OEM Unique ID
- 128b OEM Scratchpad


Fuses hold configuration that

- Establish device identity
- Provide credentials for secure operations like secure-boot, storage etc.
- Determine system security state and policy

Fuses can be programmed during device/system manufacturing stage.




Secure Boot: Verifying Code Before Execution






Secure Storage with Blobs



- Following successful secure boot, the SEC can be commanded to create blobs or decrypt them.
- There are data blobs (user specified input/output pointers) and key blobs.
- Key blobs encrypt the contents of a key register or decrypt the blob into a key register.




Key Protection



- Following successful secure boot, the SEC can be commanded to provision a Key Encryption Key (KEK).
- The KEK registers are loaded from the RNG.
- Once a KEK is provisioned, SEC descriptors can load a plaintext key and store an encrypted black key. Descriptors
 can also decrypt a key blob and re-encrypt as a black key. This allows provisioned keys to be moved from NVRAM to
 DDR.
- Black keys can be used by descriptors for normal operations, like lpsec,. Black keys are always decrypted into SEC key registers, within a minimal performance impact.



Manufacturing Protection



- Following successful secure boot, the SEC can be commanded to generate an ECC public/private key pair.
- The OEM programmed Super Root Key Hash and a NXP Secret Value are the inputs to the Key Gen process.
- Once the Hardware Key Pair is generated, the Public Key is optionally output. The Private Key isn't readable by software, and cannot be output. It can only be used by the SEC.
- The same Hardware Key Pair is generated each time the Hardware Key Pair Generation is executed. The Keys are locked out & cleared in response to a security violation.



Layerscape Security Life Cycle Stages – Enforced in HW

Stage	Product State	Assets	Operational Restrictions
Virgin	Wafer, die, or pre-test chip	None	None
Deploy Up to 5x	Finished Goods; saleable product	NXP Factory Secret Value	 NXP fuses write protected against updates Scan disabled External debug of TZ Secure World disabled
Retest	Pre-test (retest) chip	NXP Factory Secret Value	 NXP fuses write protected against updates Scan disabled External debug of TZ Secure World enabled
OEM	Finished good on OEM board	 NXP Factory Secret Value OEM SRKH, Master Key Trusted Mfg Key Pair Key Revocation, Anti-Rollback controls Additional credentials (protected by Master Key) 	 NXP fuses write protected against updates Scan disabled External debug of TZ Secure World disabled Secure Boot Only (ITS) External Debug access restricted (Debug Permissions) OEM fuses write protected against updates
OEM Update	Finished good on OEM board	Same as OEM	 Same as OEM, however one or more keys from SRKH list is revoked, no longer usable to validate image, or monotonic counter/era feature update prevents anti-rollback
Field Return Up to 2x	Finished good removed from OEM board, returned to NXP for CQI	Same as OEM	 Scan still disabled External debug of TZ Secure World re-enabled Secure Boot bypassed External Debug access controls bypassed (excepted 'Locked')
Re-Deploy	Finished good returned to OEM, remounted onto OEM board	Same as OEM	Same as OEM




Trust Architecture User's Group

NXP

Trust Architecture User's Group

Get started with your site REMOVE THIS





Site Owner/Admin

Geoffrey P Waters
Sam Sku
Control Tan Tkacik
El Add new user

Trust Architecture User's Group is a NXP hosted community

Uses extranet site to share NDA information with customers & ecosystem partners



Trust Tools & Secure Boot

Secure chain of trust

- Internal Secure Boot
- External Secure Boot Uboot, UEFI
- Partitioning of run-time environment

Rich set of configuration tools


- Programming keys, policies
- Code-signing
- Low-level programmability with ease of use

DLM Middleware

- Hooks up with Cloud provisioning agents
- Flexible API to hook into customer DLM

Leverage Trust Architecture

- HW Root of trust
- Secure provisioning and monitoring





Trusted Linux

Enhances standard off-the-shelf Linux

Ensures Trusted Applications

- Isolation of resources
- Verified installation
- Controlled launch

Ensures Trusted Data


- Isolated, encrypted user data.
- Isolated, secure credentials
- Controlled access

Ensures Trusted System

- Run-time monitoring and statistics
- Firmware update, commissioning


HW Assist by Trust Arch

- HW root of trust during boot process
- Run-time integrity check for kernel, TEE
- Secure monitor, tamper detect





EdgeScale for Secure Management



Simplifying Credential Provisioning with EdgeScale

EdgeScale

1. ODM provides Operational image, requests credentials



2. Edgescale provides signed images + Fuse-config. ODM flashes.

3. Board automatically configures credentials and reboots into secure ready-to-onboard mode.

Flexible process: Multiple options exist based on Trust relationship between OEM/ODM/NXP

4. Customer buys board from ODM.

8. C app firm

8. Customer downloads applications, updates firmware etc. via Edgescale

EdgeScale



7. Board connects to cloud, presents credentials and is enrolled.




6. Customer scans QR-code/NFC on board. Turns it on.



EdgeScale



5. Customer logsin to Edgescale.



- Hardware forms the Root of trust
- Multiple layers of tamper-detection each level validates the next
- Multiple levels of secrets can revoke at any layer
- Mutual authentication between device and cloud using Asymmetric cryptography



Security Consulting and Services

Our Security Technology








Security Consulting and Services can get you to revenue faster

Your Smart Connected Product







Summary

) Security/Trust for Cyber Physical Systems

More important in today's world than ever before An integral part of product development and deployment lifecycle Must be easy to use

) Layerscape Security Technology

A suite of Hardware and Software capabilities Covers every aspect of product lifecycle Embedded into every Layerscape system solution

EdgeScale simplifies deployment and management of secure devices





SECURE CONNECTIONS FOR A SMARTER WORLD

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